

of comparison. If I had said only what he quotes me as saying, his criticism would have been justified. As it is, I say (in the same context):—

“Verbal association and judgment are, in themselves, comparatively simple processes; but when the word associated or predicated is a fully formed concept, we realise that the simplicity of form is deceptive, that much mental elaboration lies behind.”

“Likeness” and “difference” are concepts, and have conceptual significance. I devote a section to the formation of concepts in general (pp. 294 ff.). It is not, however, the duty of Psychology, but of Anthropological Psychology, to show the genesis of particular concepts (pp. 292, 300). I was concerned simply with the process of comparison as introspection reveals it in the adult mind, not with its logical or genetic aspects.

E. B. TITCHENER.

(1) As regards the difficulty involved in counting sensation qualities, the point of difference between Prof. Titchener and myself is subtle, but philosophically interesting. I think we may both admit that the question cannot be settled by considerations of purely formal logic. In fact, Prof. Titchener's two premisses logically lead to the conclusion that “One sensation *a* is not the same as another sensation *a*, although the two are, *ex hypothesi*, indistinguishable.” The question between us is as to the interpretation of the relation “not the same as” in this connection. My contention is that the *one* and the *other* sensation differ—not merely numerically or extrinsically—but qualitatively or intrinsically. Since the one sensation *a* is distinguishable from *d*, and the other sensation *a* is not distinguishable from *d*, it seems to me that this difference between them cannot be referred to merely extrinsic conditions, but must depend on a sensationally qualitative difference in the sensation-qualities themselves.

(2) If I have unintentionally misrepresented Prof. Titchener's views on the process of comparison, I should be glad to take this opportunity of making amendment by quoting a passage from p. 299, which seems to me sound:—“In every association two ideas are brought into connection. When the connection itself has become the object of attention, when, *i.e.* we have formed an idea of connection, as distinct from the ideas which are connected, we speak of it as a *relation*.” If this passage is applied to the relation of likeness or difference apprehended in the process of comparison, I have no ground of dispute with Prof. Titchener. Only in this case I fail to see how any significance or importance can be attached to the phrase “verbal association” employed in describing the process of comparison.

W. E. JOHNSON.

Durham Degrees in Science.

AMONG the official notices of the University of Durham, I find it recorded that, on Tuesday, December 15, six gentlemen received the degree of Master in Science *by vote of Convocation*.

The degree of Master in Science has in the past been purely a *merit* degree. It was conferred only upon those who had previously taken the degree of Bachelor in Science, who were of, at least, two years' standing, and who succeeded in passing an additional examination in some branch of one of the scientific subjects professed at the University. The degree was, in fact, until to-day, an authoritative statement that the holder was not only a specialist in his particular subject, but also that he had received that sound University training in science and general knowledge of which the Bachelor in Science degree is a *proof*.

This has now been changed. The degree has been granted merely “by vote of Convocation” for no specified cause. Before December 15, it was evidence of merit of a particular kind. Now it is not. Apart from other considerations, this is a great hardship upon many other graduates in science. Grouped together in the list of Masters in Science are those who have gained the honour by their scientific attainments, and those who have received it for non-specified reasons by vote of Convocation.

Such a radical change in the nature of a degree deserves public notice, and this must be my apology for troubling you with this letter.


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NOTE ON METHOD SUGGESTED FOR MEASURING VAPOUR PRESSURES.¹

THE distillation of vapour from one of the vertical tubes to the other, referred to at the end of Operation No. 4, in my communication published in last week's NATURE (p. 373), may be wholly got quit of by the following simplified mode of procedure.

Operate first on one only of the liquids until it is got into equilibrium, with its upper level at any convenient marked point in its glass tube, and nothing but its own



vapour between this surface and the closed stopcock immediately above it; the upper-neck stopcock over the bottle for this liquid being also closed.

Operate similarly on the other liquid; and close both the air-pump stopcocks, so that now we have all the stopcocks closed.

Open now very gradually the upper-neck stopcocks of the two bottles. While doing so, prevent the liquid from rising in either tube above the marked point by working the air-pump and very slightly opening the lower air-pump stopcock. When both the upper-neck

¹ See NATURE, p. 274.