Mind in Man and Brute

Abstract

THE subject with which Mr. Romanes deals in this volume is one which presents great, if not insuperable, difficulties. Whether or not there be a difference in kind—that is, in origin—between the mind of man and the mind of the brute, it is only in terms of the former that the latter can be interpreted. We can only reach minds other than our own by an ejective process of inference. Fully admitting that the evidence is amply sufficient to justify us in inferring the existence of mental processes in our dumb companions, the fact remains that there are enormous difficulties in getting at the nature of these mental processes. Our mental life is carried on in a rare atmosphere of self-conscious conceptual thought, And before we can put ourselves ejectively into the place of the brute, we have to divest ourselves of our conceptual habiliments; nay, more, we have—if current views be correct—to strip off the inner garment of our self-consciousness. Hence, some thinkers are driven to the extremity of agnosticism in this matter, and hold with Prof. Max Müller that, “according to the strict rules of positive philosophy, we have no right to assert or deny anything with reference to the so-called mind of animals.”This, no doubt, is going too far. But, seeing that mind in the animal world and in very young children has to be interpreted not only by, but also in terms of, human consciousness, it behoves the investigator to at least express his opinions with becoming modesty. I cannot say that Mr. Romanes's modesty is obtrusive. There is, indeed, a tone of “cocksureness”ill befitting the subject in hand, and painfully marring the dignity of a work the ability and earnestness of which are conspicuous.

Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human Faculty.

By G. J. Romanes (London: Ktigan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1888.)