Abstract

What is the nature of our ability to understand and reason about the beliefs of others — the possession of a 'theory of mind', or ToM? Here, we review findings from imaging and lesion studies indicating that ToM reasoning is supported by a widely distributed neural system. Some functional components of this system, such as language-related regions of the left hemisphere, the frontal lobes and the right temporal–parietal cortex, are not solely dedicated to the computation of mental states. However, the system also includes a core, domain-specific component that is centred on the amygdala circuitry. We provide a framework in which impairments of ToM can be viewed in terms of abnormalities of the core system, the failure of a co-opted system that is necessary for performance on a particular set of tasks, or the absence of an experiential trigger for the emergence of ToM.

Author affiliations

1. Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TP, UK.
2. Department of Human Communication Sciences, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TA, UK.

Correspondence to: Michael Siegal¹ Email: m.siegal@sheffield.ac.uk