Access
This article is part of Nature's premium content.
Published online 4 November 2009 | Nature | doi:10.1038/news.2009.1065
News
Gene-makers put forward security standards
But few companies are willing to sign up yet.
Several gene-synthesis companies yesterday finalized a code of conduct that outlines how to screen orders for synthetic DNA that could be used for terrorist activities.
The code, which has been in the works from the International Association of Synthetic Biology (IASB) in Heidelberg, Germany, for a year and a half, reflects for the most part what has become common practice in gene-synthesis companies.
To read this story in full you will need to login or make a payment (see right).
Comments
Reader comments are usually moderated after posting. If you find something offensive or inappropriate, you can speed this process by clicking 'Report this comment' (or, if that doesn't work for you, email webadmin@nature.com). For more controversial topics, we reserve the right to moderate before comments are published.
It is a nice move. But you have to bear in mind that terrorist organisations can easily buy weapons these days. Even they could buy weapons from countries that impose loads of rules on them. I think it is not difficult for them to buy some scientific instruments to synthesis their own DNA or whatever. Or they could make one themselves. Anyhow it is duty for every governments to prevent terrorist to access to such important technologies in general.
"I think it is not difficult for them to buy some scientific instruments to synthesis their own DNA or whatever. Or they could make one themselves. Anyhow it is duty for every governments to prevent terrorist to access to such important technologies in general."
You are absolutely correct, its not difficult for terrorist organizations to buy or, given the appropriate accessibility to equipment, manufacture virulent biological agents. I also agree that is it the the government's duty to enact biosecurity measures that balance the need to advance research with the need for national security. These gene synthesis security measures are good steps towards a goal, but they aren't incredibly novel or radically beyond existing policies of other corporations.
The reason (at least in the U.S.) that no real action has been taken is that private corporations maintain an astonishing monopoly over the majority of biological research. Corporations think their biosecurity and bioseafety protocols are adequate, though this is woefully inaccurate. They see any additional security measures as cutting into their profits and fight any legislation or policy that would do so.
So while, its easy to say "regulate," its much harder to implement.
Gene sequences of organisms which may be used as biological weapons should be kept confidential. Any scientific research which may lead to development of biological weapons should not be made public.United Nation and other global agencies should make BIOLOGICAL SECURITY COUNCIL to handel such global biological war problem.