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Published online 17 March 2008 | Nature | doi:10.1038/news.2008.677
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How we judge the thoughts of others
Brain division could help explain stereotyping, religious conflict and racism.
How do we know what another person is thinking? New research suggests we use the same brain region that we do when thinking about ourselves — but only as long as we judge the person to be similar to us.
When second-guessing the opinions and feelings of those unlike ourselves, this brain region does not get involved, the new research shows.
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From the author: The idea that we may see dissimilar others as "less human" is highly speculative (as are many of the statements quoted here without contextual background -- understandably, but somewhat unfortunately), and it is worth clarifying that our study does not directly provide any evidence of dehumanization. Previous work by other researchers has implicated a highly similar region of the brain in dehumanization, showing that the region's response was weaker when participants viewed members of dehumanized groups (see Harris & Fiske, 2006). However, the (somewhat tenuous) connection to our work is simply that the region also responds less to people we perceive to be dissimilar from ourselves. What our study does suggest is that the process that becomes engaged when we introspect (i.e., when we consider our own preferences, thoughts and feelings) also appears to be engaged when we think about the mind of someone we perceive to be similar to ourselves -- but less so when we consider the mind of someone we perceive to be different. -Adrianna C. Jenkins
I believe the reference is 2008 and not 2007 http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0708785105v1
Is there not a 'not' missing in the first sentence of the second paragraph?
The clarification by the author here is welcome. It is also appreciated that the paper is readily accessible at PNAS. The study observes some very stimulating correlations and the authors make a clear rationale for their conjectures. They are to be congratulated. BTW: I loved the word "numerosities" that appears in the paper.
I agree with William Brookfield, the first sentence of the second paragraph was obviously meant to be «When second-guessing the opinions and feelings of those unlike ourselves, this brain region does not get involved, the new research shows.» ... Henri
Hello - editor here. Apologies for the typo in the second paragraph - there was indeed a 'not' missing! It has been put back in.
I think that the results of the article are quite in line with lessons from history. The german NAZIS were able of the Holocauste just by thinking that jews were infra-humans, and to treat them as criminals to be eliminated. They were able to think in this way about a person as soon as that person was identified as a "jew", but the feel compassion about a person (same physical person) provide he were not identified as "jew". I think that this way of changing our brain swicht is independent of splitted brain. We can pass from "love to hate" the same person if we are able tochange our mind from "friend to enemy" (for instance when we feel that he has betrayed us.
Science has taught us that there is hardly any evidence of two identical persons (save twins). Even twins do not or cannot comprehend each other's thinking process. It is thus impossible to even speculate, leave alone visualise one's thought processes. Although it has a strong genetic rooting, circumstances / ambience / environment / context do influence thought / reactive processes in humans.
"oriental?" how bout some "red indians" or "hindoos"?
I'm not sure where this discovery gets us. Even if completely different parts of 'the' brain (withstanding phenotypic variations) are involved in imputations of mental states to others we perceive as unlike ourselves in relevant respects it doesn't explain anything about our relation to them / our perceptions of them. Moreover, anthropomorphism and other forms of projection do not necessarily involve generalizing (aka 'stereotyping'). E.g., people often seem to attribute various mental states to their dogs but not other dogs of the same breed. But maybe I'm just projecting my theory of their mental states?
The assumption: "... a brain region called the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), which is known to be involved in thinking about oneself. If you are asked, for example, whether you like baseball, this brain region will kick into life as you reflect on your love (or not) of the sport." needs more accurate evidence, in my point of view. According to some theorists (e.g. Joseph LeDoux) that's might not be so simple. There might be much more parallel processing, in other regions, or synapses, than those in this cortex area, that might be important (of course), but not so determinant. Therefore, the deduction of results might be biased. I hope it will not, but this is a belief option. --Fernando Sereno (ANN's and mathematical education researcher at the Institute of Biomedical Engineering at Oporto, PT)