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Published online 16 January 2008 | Nature 451, 230-231 (2008) | doi:10.1038/451230a
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Nuclear war: the safety paradox
In the second of a series of articles, Geoff Brumfiel looks at whether certain nuclear-weapons technology should be shared.
When a series of weapons tests announces a new member of the nuclear club, as in both Pakistan and India in May 1998, the natural response is to do everything possible to punish the proliferator and limit its future nuclear development. But some nuclear experts are drawn to the merits of the opposite course of action — supplying advice and technological aid.
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Looking to America as a model sytem of nuclear weapons safety is a dangerous proposition, given that only last year six nuclear warheads went missing for 36 hours, during which time they were flown across the US in launch position on B52 bombers. This incident was associated with six mysterious violent deaths within the air force, and attempted coverup by the military and the Pentagon. Military officials state that at least 20 mistakes must have been made for this to occur. Is this the safety standard we are asking of nuclear nations worldwide? http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7441