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Published online 10 October 2007 | Nature 449, 656-657 (2007) | doi:10.1038/449656a
News Feature
Non-proliferation: School of Nukes
How do nuclear inspectors know when all is not as they are told? Geoff Brumfiel joins some inspectors-in-training as they learn the ropes at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
At half-past eight in the morning, the New Mexico sun already hot on our necks, we gather outside what could be the entrance of a high-security prison. Past the guard post and fence lies a tan, windowless building that covers about a city block.
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The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was not amended in 1997. Nor is it the agreement under which the IAEA operates. The limitations to existing safeguards agreements lead set the stage for safeguards strengthening efforts culminating in the approval in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol. It is only for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force that the Agency has the verification tools it needs to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Would the NDA be useful in public health laboratories who often screen unknown and suspicious samples for radioactivity? If yes, they could also use it in the event of an incident of national significance in order to triage patients. . . It seems it may only detect weapons grade materials in high quantities. Where can I learn more about the assay?
Hi Simon, Thanks very much for your note. On the first point, you're absolutely right: 1997 additional protocol was not an amendment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The additional protocol is a voluntary agreement entered into by states who are already signatories of the treaty. On the second, although the IAEA was set up under the 1956 “IAEA Statute,†it was basically powerless to conduct safeguard activities until the NPT was ratified in 1968. So I think it’s fair to say colloquially that the IAEA “operates under the NPT†when it comes to inspections. Best, Geoff