Abstract
To overcome the current impasse in global climate negotiations we propose a compromise for sharing the remaining carbon budget, based on four elements. First, limiting initial action to the Major Economies Forum members would streamline negotiations greatly. Second, using consumption-based carbon accounting would overcome important fairness concerns of key developing countries. Similarly, applying equity principles of responsibility and capability to apportion the burden of emissions reductions within the group can address concerns of both the global north and south. And fourth, promptly bringing this compromise back to the United Nations negotiations for wider adoption will be critical. Based on an indicative carbon budget of 420 gigatonnes carbon dioxide over the period 2012–2050, our analysis shows that ambitious but feasible emissions reductions will be needed, with sharp differences by world economic groups. The compromise offers effectiveness, feasibility and fairness.
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Change history
02 October 2014
In the version of this Perspective originally published, reference 20 contained a typographical error and should have read: Purdon, M. Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance. J. Int. Relat. Dev. 17, 301–338 (2014). This error has now been corrected in the HTML and PDF versions of the Perspective.
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Acknowledgements
We thank S. Calgaro, D. Roser and G. Vittucci Marzetti. This version remains our own responsibility.
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M.G. conceived the study. M.G. and J.T.R carried out the study and contributed to writing the article.
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Grasso, M., Roberts, J. A compromise to break the climate impasse. Nature Clim Change 4, 543–549 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2259
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2259