A means of verifying that nuclear warheads to be dismantled are genuine items has been proposed that potentially reveals no information to an inspector about the design of the weapons. Two experts explain the ins and outs of the method and its implications for arms-control policy. See Article p.497
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Finney, J., Acton, J. Identifying a hidden warhead. Nature 510, 476–477 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/510476a
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/510476a