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Evolution of cooperative strategies from first principles

Nature volume 440, pages 1041–1044 (2006)Cite this article

Abstract

One of the greatest challenges in the modern biological and social sciences is to understand the evolution of cooperative behaviour. General outlines of the answer to this puzzle are currently emerging as a result of developments in the theories of kin selection1,2,3,4,5,6,7, reciprocity8,9,10, multilevel selection11,12,13,14,15 and cultural group selection16,17. The main conceptual tool used in probing the logical coherence of proposed explanations has been game theory, including both analytical models and agent-based simulations6,7,9,18,19,20,21,22,23,24. The game-theoretic approach yields clear-cut results but assumes, as a rule, a simple structure of payoffs and a small set of possible strategies. Here we propose a more stringent test of the theory by developing a computer model with a considerably extended spectrum of possible strategies. In our model, agents are endowed with a limited set of receptors, a set of elementary actions and a neural net in between. Behavioural strategies are not predetermined; instead, the process of evolution constructs and reconstructs them from elementary actions. Two new strategies of cooperative attack and defence emerge in simulations, as well as the well-known dove, hawk and bourgeois strategies. Our results indicate that cooperative strategies can evolve even under such minimalist assumptions, provided that agents are capable of perceiving heritable external markers of other agents.

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Figure 1: The effect of resource abundance on population density.
Figure 2: The effect of resource abundance on the long-term proportions of agents using various strategies.
Figure 3: Dynamic coexistence of the raven, the cooperative dove and the starling strategies.

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Acknowledgements

We thank P. Taylor, H. Gintis and C. Cioffi-Revilla for comments on the manuscript. M.B. was supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research. P.T. was supported by the NSF.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Non-linear Dynamics, Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics of RAS, 125047, Moscow, Russia

    Mikhail Burtsev

  2. Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Connecticut, Connecticut, 06269-3042, Storrs, USA

    Peter Turchin

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  1. Mikhail Burtsev
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Correspondence to Mikhail Burtsev.

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Burtsev, M., Turchin, P. Evolution of cooperative strategies from first principles. Nature 440, 1041–1044 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04470

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