Sir

It has been suggested that the best way for the United States to keep biotechnology-enhanced biological weapons away from terrorist groups is for it to support related research and training only for US scientists (see, for example, Nature 414, 3–4; 200110.1038/35102219). We do not believe such an isolationist attitude to be useful. Increasing research support and training in biotechnology and genomics to scientists in the developing world may be the best way to prevent bioweapon attacks on the United States and its allies.

Inadequate funding by northern scientific bodies — of other scientific disciplines as well as genomics and biotechnology — marginalizes southern scientists and widens the gap between northern and southern scientists' mindsets. If southern scientists are given a stake in the northern system, through sponsored research opportunities, its scientists will be less likely to want to help terrorist actions against northern interests.

Southern scientists are, of course, making significant novel contributions to science, which could include assisting the development of biodefence strategies. Their contributions are not only welcome, but enhanced northern research support could also challenge the stereotype that the north does not have the interests of the south at heart — a view propagated by anti-northern extremist groups. Scientists everywhere, south or north, need to be aware of the regulatory and ethical implications of bioweapon proliferation. Sponsored training by northern funding agencies is the best way to achieve this end.

Such training in genomics and biotechnology could be made conditional upon such scientists passing stringent intelligence review and verification by the sponsoring institution or its authorized representative, and their states being signatories to chemical- and biologicalwarfare conventions and protocols. Given the potential trade and investment opportunities that come with a skilled, biotechnologically competent workforce, sponsoring advanced training of southern scientists in genomics or biotechnology could serve as an incentive for countries to sign and comply with the conventions.

The Fogarty International Center of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has budgeted approximately $45 million for the training of international scientists for fiscal year 2002–03. Although this approach is commendable, apart from the dilution of the money over all the sub-disciplines in health, the amount is minuscule compared with the $1.75 billion the US government has allocated to the NIH for biodefence research alone in 2003. Increasing research support and training in biotechnology and genomics would make it easier for northern scientists to say to their southern colleagues: “We're acting with you, so don't act against us.”